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Abstract
CRISPR is a powerful new biochemical tool that can be used to edit the DNA of somatic cells or the 
germline. It can be used for good ends such as the treatment or prevention of illness or disability, or for 
bad ends. All its uses for good ends can be sorted out into six kinds of cases: editing somatic cells to treat 
or prevent disease-a therapeutic use; editing somatic cells to enhance a living thing; editing the germline 
to prevent future disease-a second therapeutic use; editing the germline to enhance future living things; 
editing somatic cells for research to understand nature and unlock its secrets; and editing the germline for 
the same research purposes. Recent discussions by various experts, in the science, ethics, and governance 
of gene editing, show confidence in the first kind of case-that it is a good use provided the editing is safe 
and effective; and hesitation, doubts, and calls to stop editing in the next three cases. The paper explores the 
basis of our confidence in the somatic therapeutic case, and compares it systematically to the enhancement 
cases, while using the research cases for what they teach us about good ends. The center of this approach is 
that our confidence in the therapeutic somatic case is based on our agreement that health is a fundamental 
good, and the paper suggests an analogy between the ethics of therapy and the ethics of enhancement, 
which throws some light on the difficult cases of human enhancement.
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Creation (Part I, THE TOOL, Chs. 1-4) Doudna and Strernberg give 
a very informative and accessible account of the discovery of CRISPR, 
its main uses so far, and references to their colleagues who are working 
on gene editing. Human Genome Editing (HGE) also has a very 
informative discussion of the science and research on gene editing. 
And Wikipedia, available to everyone free on the Internet, has a long 
article on CIRSPR with helpful illustrations. CRISPR is a TOOL and 
as a tool, it has CAPABILITIES.  D & S help us to sort out it main basic 
capabilities: it can edit the DNA inside cells of living things, plants or 
animals (whether in a laboratory or in a living thing), by deleting or 
inserting letters of DNA (the chemical compounds A T, C G); or by 
changing whole sequences of letters, thus changing the DNA of a gene 
and the genome of a species. The analogy of editing a text is helpful, 
but the process of editing DNA is biochemical, while in editing a text 
there no biochemistry; so the analogy is helpful, but purely formal 
and rather simplistic. By virtue of these basic capabilities, mutations 
in genes inside somatic cells (non-heritable material) responsible for 
any genetic disease in a living thing can be deleted, or inserted, or 
modified;  mutations in genes in the germline (heritable material) can 
be similarly edited so that future generations are not as susceptible to 
genetic disease. In D’s and S’ words: “As long as the genetic code for 
a particular trait is known, scientists can use CRISPR to insert, edit, 
or delete the associated gene in virtually any living plant’s or animal’s 
genome.” (A Crack in Creation, xiii).
CRISPR-The Tool’s Majoruses and their Ethical Dimension
As a tool CRISPR has many applications, and these uses clearly have 
an ethical dimension, that is, they can be good or bad, right or wrong. 
When used to bring about a specific goal, the editing can be beneficial 
or harmful depending, in part, on the goal for which the editing is 
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Introductıon
Jennifer Doudna’s and Samuel Sternberg’s book, A Crack in Creation 
[1], is a wonderful introduction to the discovery of CRISPR, a powerful 
biochemical process for gene editing, to its incredible capabilities, its 
many uses, and the important questions it raises about the present and 
future of the plant and animal kingdom and the human race. Doudna 
and Sternberg (D & S) tell us that the variety of questions CRISPR 
raises, bio-technical, ethical, legal and regulatory, cannot be answered 
only by scientists but need to be considered by the whole society. And 
indeed the discussions have already included scientists, government, 
law, and bioethicists. As many have pointed out, the pace of progress 
in this biotechnology is so rapid that we cannot wait but must discuss 
these questions now.
A Crack in Creation is written in language accessible to everyone, 
as a narrative of Doudna’s journey to the discovery of CRISPR, 
conveying both her excitement about this major discovery and her 
ethical concerns about its uses. A second important book, Human 
Genome Editing (HGE) [2] is an authoritative and informative report 
by the National Academy of Science and the National Academy of 
Medicine, on the Science, Ethics, and Governance of gene editing. 
Reading these two books was a great learning experience and led me 
to think about the fundamental ethical issues of gene editing.
As an outsider who has no expertise in the science of gene editing, 
only some experience teaching ethics, and in the spirit of contributing 
to public discussion, I make a modest attempt to place the basic ethical 
questions in a systematic context: is gene editing good or bad, right 
or wrong, especially in the difficult applications for enhancement of 
human beings? I have already learned that the ethics of CRISPR can 
be a complex, difficult, and even an uncomfortable  subject, and we 
can all try for clarity of thought, attention to the facts, to relevant 
distinctions, and to sound reasoning; all of which, however, have to be 
accessible to everyone because gene editing concerns everyone.
CRISPR-The Tool and its Basic capabilities
What is CRISPR and how does it work? What are its present and its 
future capabilities? These are questions for the scientists to answer, those 
who discovered and are using gene editing and CRISPR. In A Crack in
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for research purposes. These research uses are important because 
their aim is all important: understanding nature and unlocking 
its secrets (See B & S, Ch. 3, Cracking the Code, and HGE, Ch. 3). 
Without successful research we cannot successfully attempt any 
clinical applications, the four applications of gene editing, including 
the urgent and compelling somatic therapeutic. The ethics of research 
is not the focus of this paper, but these research uses are instructive 
and revealing and we will return to them.
Somatic Therapeutic Uses of CRISPR
Editing DNA of somatic cells (whose DNA is not heritable) to treat 
or prevent a genetic disease or disability in a living thing is usually 
called a therapeutic use, since it is used to treat disease or restore 
health-an important good. This is a good or beneficial use of editing, 
provided that the editing is safe and effective, and has a favorable risk/
benefit analysis (see, e.g. D& S, Ch. 6, To Heal the Sick). Of course 
editing of such somatic cells can also be used to produce a disease-and 
this would be a bad or harmful use-the opposite of a therapeutic use. 
In therapeutic cases, the ends and means are fairly perspicuous and 
hard to confuse: the ends are health, or treating or preventing disease 
or disability; and the editing is the means. Moreover, we already have 
experience of the somatic therapeutic cases, for example from gene 
therapy, and most experts think we already have adequate regulations 
for their safe and effective use. (HGE, Ch. 4, especially pp. 109-10). In 
these somatic therapeutic cases we see confidence about the means 
and confidence that the end is good.
Somatic Enhancement Applications
Here the means are similar to somatic therapeutic applications, the 
editing of genes in somatic cells, and the regulations already in place 
seem sufficient for assuring the safety and efficacy of the editing. But 
the goals are different: instead of the treatment or prevention of disease 
or disability or the restoration of health, we have the goal of enhancing 
an individual human being. But what is human enhancement? When 
we go beyond or outside health (a good to be pursued) and disease 
(an ill to be avoided), this question seems wide open. This affects the 
risk/benefits analysis, since what the benefits are is wide open. And 
when we look at the discussions of this application in the literature 
we see hesitation and uncertainty about the goal of enhancement, a 
call for temporary bans and for more discussion. HGE has a subtle 
and helpful discussion of the distinction between enhancement and 
therapy; and though there may be borderline cases and intermediates 
between therapy and enhancement, the distinction is maintained (see 
HGE, Ch. 6, especially pp, 137-48, and D & S, Ch. 7 & 8).
Germline Therapeutic Applications
CRISPR and other gene editing can also be used, by editing DNA in 
the germline (heritable material), to prevent genetic disease in future 
specimens of a species-another good use, another therapeutic use. Of 
course it can also be used to cause a disease in future specimens of a 
species-another bad use. Thus this application of gene editing also has 
a clear ethical dimension-it can be good or bad, beneficial or harmful: 
and that depends on at least two things: whether its goals are good 
or bad, and whether the editing (means) is safe and effective. There 
may be plenty of devils in the details of these uses: e.g. the details 
of safety, of efficacy, of cost/benefit analysis. Though it may seem 
essentially similar to somatic therapeutic uses with respect to goals, 
to treat or prevent disease or disability, editing the germline is far 
more complicated with respect to means. The effects of the editing of
used. When the editing is designed and used to produce a desirable 
or good or beneficial goal, then its use is good, provided that the 
editing is safe (e.g.no off target editing and/or minimal side effects), 
and effective in reaching the goal; in similarity to earlier gene therapy, 
drugs, and traditional medical procedures-also tools --, where safety 
and efficacy are familiar requirements. If the goal is good but there 
is off target editing or minimal side effects, the editing can still be 
good on the whole or on balance, provided that the benefits outweigh 
the harm (favorable risk/benefit analysis). On the other hand, if the 
editing is designed and used to produce a bad or undesirable or 
harmful goal, then the editing is also bad, and in this case the more 
effective it is the worse it is.
Two Distinctions
When we discuss whether an editing is good or bad or right or 
wrong, we need to pay careful attention to two distinctions. One 
distinction is between means and ends: we need to identify means 
and ends correctly in a particular gene editing use, and be aware of the 
interplay of means and ends (e.g., in cost/benefit analysis). Confusing 
means and ends, generally, or in a particular gene editing application, 
can make it difficult to reach sound conclusions or decisions. In the 
logic of its capabilities and its means-ends uses, CRISPR is similar 
to other tools and instruments we are familiar with from our human 
history-for example, the capabilities and uses of wheels, engines, 
nuclear energy, solar panels, surgery, drugs, and traditional artificial 
selection. The uses of all these tools and instruments also have an 
ethical dimension-their uses too can be good or bad, right or wrong; 
and we are familiar with ethical discussions of their uses. We can try 
to judge and evaluate CRISPR’s uses in similar ways. Where CRISPR 
is unusual though not unique, is in its very powerful basic capabilities 
and the corresponding uses: “The CRISPR/Cas9 system is simpler, 
faster … cheaper… highly efficient…. and has revolutionized the 
field of genome editing….” (HGE, p. 63). A change of one or more 
letters in the DNA of a gene inside a cell can eliminate or produce a 
catastrophic illness in a living thing; it can eliminate or produce such 
an illness in future specimens of a species; and editing the genome 
can even create a big variation in the future population of a species-
almost a new species. (D & Sprovide many examples of current uses 
of CRISPR, in Chapter 5, The CRISPR Menagerie; many examples are 
also discussed in HGE, Ch. 4, 5, & 6).
B & Sare also helpful in emphasizing again and again the second 
important distinction, the crucial difference between editing genes of 
somatic cells and editing the germline. This distinction is also clearly 
drawn, and forms the division between Ch. 5, Somatic Genome 
Editing, and Ch. 6, Heritable Genome Editing, in HGE. The editing 
of genes in somatic cells is not heritable; we are affecting only a single 
individual. But the editing of the germline is heritable, so germline 
editing can affect the human genome for generations to come, and the 
benefits or harms it may cause can be greater, last far longer, maybe 
non reversible, and are thus more uncertain. Editing of somatic cells 
can benefit or harm a single specimen; germline editing can affect a 
whole species, bringing more extensive changes for good or ill.
Using these two distinctions, the applications of gene editing that 
D& S discuss-perhaps all applications of gene editing discussed 
extensively in HGE--can be sorted out into four classes or groups: 
Somatic therapeutic applications; somatic enhancement; germline 
therapeutic; and germline enhancement applications. (For these four 
groups see also HGE, p. 146) [2].
Using the same two distinctions, we have a fifth and sixth important 
use or two more groups, namely, somatic and germline editing, both
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about by gene editing. (For a an informed discussion of present and 
future electronic  versions, see Martin Rees, On the Future Prospects 
of Humanity, Princeton U.P., 2018, Ch. 3 &4) [3].
Which of these many versions, if any, or which combination thereof, 
if any, or what new version of enhanced or improved human beings, 
do we choose to bring about by CRISPR and other gene editing? How 
do we evaluate and rank the many versions of enhanced humans so 
that we can make rational choices- choose the best if we can, or the 
second best, and so on?
These substantial and fundamental ethical questions are far more 
difficult to answer than our questions in therapeutic applications.
For one thing, the editing is still the means, but the improved 
or enhanced version of human being is the end or goal; and that 
end or goal, an enhanced or improved human being, might not in 
turn be a means to another goal; so we may not be able to evaluate 
an enhancement as a means to some further goal. As philosophers 
and social scientists have argued for a long time, it is a lot easier to 
evaluate means to an end than the end itself, unless that end is in turn 
a means to some further goal. And what further ends would we create 
enhanced human beings for?
The cases where we use gene editing to enhance plants or non-
human animals are importantly different from the human case. We 
have already used CRISPR and other gene editing to enhance plants 
and non-human animals (see D & S, Ch. 5, for many such uses). In 
these uses we have in effect treated enhanced plants and animals as 
means to human ends, such ends being, e.g. better nutrition or health 
for human beings. And of course in research we have used non-
human animals for what may be the most important human purpose, 
to help us understand nature and discover its secrets (See, e.g. D & S, 
Ch. 3, Cracking the Code, where this research purpose is displayed 
at its best).Using such human ends we can decide rationally what 
enhancements we want in crops or non-human animals. That is how 
we have solved the problem of what an enhanced plant or enhanced 
non-human animal is. Some object, of course, to using plants and 
certainly animals for human purposes, even for research. Perhaps, to 
put the matter very modestly, it may be only a human conceit, a very 
old one, that plants and other animals exist for the benefit of human 
beings and can be used accordingly; not to speak of the fact that many 
plants and non-human animals existed millions of years before we 
appeared-they are being used by us for our purposes, but they did not 
come into being for us.
Using gene editing to enhance human beings is essentially different 
from using it to enhance plants or other animals, since we have no 
other beings’ purposes as a goal. Creating enhanced human beings 
for the purposes of other beings, human or non-human, in parallel 
to creating enhanced plants or non-human animals for the purposes 
of human beings, would be wrong on the face of it. We need only 
reflect on the uses of human beings as slaves, as being bred and used 
for the purposes of other human beings, to see that this would be 
wrong; and it would not be agreed to even by those who use plants 
and non-human animals for human purposes without qualms. Our 
doubts and hesitations about and restrictions to using human subjects 
in experiments for our research purposes teach us a similar lesson.
Abuses in eugenics also teach us a similar lesson. A eugenics 
program has three essential parts (and many parts of parts left out 
here): a conception of what human enhancement is (what the “well”
specimens, such as viable embryos whose future potential diseases we 
are trying to prevent, stretch indefinitely into future generations, and 
there can be more devils in the details. For example, while CRISPR is 
not error prone it is nevertheless not error proof (See D& S, 178-81, 
214-15, 223-4). Mistakes (e.g. off target editing) may be magnified in 
future generations; such mistakes may not be reversible; and even the 
intended effects (the new gene variants) may interact unpredictably 
with future environments; so we may have far more uncertainty (For 
the many difficult issues with editing the germline, see also, HGE, Ch. 
5 & 6). Another devil is working out problems with permission and 
consent for these procedures with embryos: who is to give permission 
or consent for editing a viable embryo? Current answers are parental 
autonomy and parental rights (HGE, pp. 120-21); but how far do these 
rights stretch into the future, to generations of grandchildren and 
great grandchildren, and on and on? We can presently ask good basic 
ethical questions about these cases, about the goals and the means to 
them, in parallel to somatic therapeutic cases. But here, because we 
are editing the germline, we seem to be stuck with good questions and 
not confident enough good ethical answers. This use clearly needs a 
lot of informed and reasoned discussion; and such discussions may 
need more scientific progress; more accurate editing, for example, 
before we have reasonable and acceptable answers (See e.g. D & S, 
178-81, for experiments to find more accurate editing). The literature 
on germline therapeutic editing fully reflects this state of affairs: it is 
full of caution, uncertainty, calls for temporary bans, and waiting for 
more scientific progress and more informed discussion. (See HGE, 
Ch. 5, and final recommendations in Ch. 8, pp 193-4).
Germline Editing to Enhance Human Beings
Using germline editing to “improve” or “enhance” human beings, 
in the present and future generations, as distinct from treating or 
preventing disease or disability (or restoring or maintaining health), is 
a far more difficult undertaking both scientifically and ethically. This 
use is similar to the germline therapeutic use in that it involves editing 
the germline, with all its difficulties; but different in goals since it aims 
at enhancement or improvement of human beings. And as in the case 
of somatic enhancement, the goals here can go beyond health and are 
wide open. Thus this is the most difficult of all applications. We have 
not only the problems of the means, germline editing, but also the 
basic problem of what the goal(s) is. What is an enhanced or improved 
human being?
Enhanced Human Beings
This basic ethical problem, what is an enhanced human being, is 
not new, and can be posed historically: in religions, in philosophy, 
in theology, in poetry, in fiction and the visual arts, there have been 
many different versions of improved or enhanced human beings. 
For example, we have images and descriptions of gods who are 
clearly anthropomorphic-that is, gods as super humans, humans 
with increased mental and/or physical powers (leaving aside the 
myth of immortality). And we have many, many versions of these: 
the several gods of the ancient religions, the gods of the philosophers 
in ancient times, the gods of the theologians in middle ages, the 
gods of the modern philosophers and theologians. And in modern 
fiction and visual arts, we have many versions of “superman” and 
“wonder woman.” Of course, some of these versions of super humans, 
especially in contemporary science fiction, are electronic versions, 
which are not be within the powers of gene editing; these are also 
interesting, technologically and ethically, but we are not concerned 
with them here, but only with biological versions that can be brought
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this case we have no disagreement or uncertainty about the goodness 
of the ends (treating or preventing disease or disability).On the 
other hand, somatic enhancement highlights, almost isolates, the 
difficulty of judging or deciding what human enhancement is, since 
the somatic editing here is roughly similar to the somatic editing in 
therapeutic cases. Germline enhancement is the hardest case because 
it combines these two sorts of difficulties about both means and ends. 
In this structured context I want to see if we can get some light on an 
approach to human enhancement.
The Ethics of Therapy and the Ethics of Enhancement
One way to lay bare the ethics of therapy is to learn from the two 
therapeutic cases, where we have no doubt about the ends, treating 
or preventing genetic diseases, present and future, or better health 
for human beings. In successful somatic therapeutic cases a treated 
individual is better than s/he was earlier, given some measured 
baseline before the treatment; and in successful germline therapeutic 
uses individuals in the future will be better than they are now, given 
some more complex present baseline for the human population. 
Whatever other improvements we may want, we want at least lesser 
disease or better health for the individual or the species; so long 
as we are confident enough that health is a basic human good and 
disease something fundamentally bad. The reason why we don’t 
have the usual difficulties about enhancement when we try to make 
human beings less susceptible to disease or healthier is because we 
agree, as we should, that health is a fundamental human good, to be 
pursued as an end, and disease something certainly bad and to be 
avoided. It is our universal agreement to and confidence that health is 
a fundamental good and disease a basic ill that gives an ethical basis to 
and secures our evaluative judgments in the therapeutic uses of gene 
editing. In these uses we have no doubts about the goals because we 
have no doubts that health is a great, fundamental good. This might 
be a bit hidden from us in the literature because the standard way 
the goal is stated in therapeutic cases is “the treatment or prevention 
of disease or disability” (the standard use throughout HGE); rather 
than restoration or maintenance of health; indeed “health” does not 
even appear in the glossary of this comprehensive work, perhaps 
because there may be disagreement about its definition. But disease 
and disability are ills and treating or preventing them is surely an 
improvement.
Improvement is also fundamental to enhancement. HGE (p. 
137) discusses this link, as well as several proposed definitions 
of enhancement (p. 145).Though none of these definitions offer 
anywhere near a complete analysis of enhancement, I think because 
they do not specify any goods as goals, they agree that enhancement 
is an improvement from an existing condition; and that is something 
that therapy and enhancement have in common. Of course they are 
also distinct.
The distinction between the two may not be as hard and rigid as it 
might appear. See HGE (pp. 137-47), for a sophisticated and helpful 
discussion; prevention, for example, might be either. D & S (pp. 230-
31) also have a helpful discussion of the thin line that sometimes 
exists between therapy and enhancement, and offer many examples 
of a “slippery slope” from therapy to enhancement. The slope may be 
slippery, but dangerous only if we are not sure that the enhancement 
we end up with is really an improvement.
Therapy and enhancement have in common improvement from 
an existing condition. They can differ in the goods to be pursued,
is in “well born”), a means to achieving it, and the conditions under 
which the program is implemented. Plato, for example, who had 
the first eugenics program for his ideal city in his Repubic, thought 
that the most intelligent-born (and best educated) humans were the 
best humans, he proposed artificial selection (modeled after animal 
selection) to make the best with the best, but used deceptive tactics to 
mate them (the very opposite of voluntary participation and informed 
consent). The Nazis notoriously went badly wrong on all three parts: 
a racist conception of enhancement, massive killings of “lesser races”, 
and violations of every human right. Even in a democratic country 
like the United States, we had the sterilization abuses that went 
certainly wrong on voluntary participation and informed consent, 
to say the least. (In The Gene, An Intimate History, Gale, New York, 
2016, S. Mukherjee gives a detailed account of modern eugenics that 
have gone wrong in one or another of the three essential parts) [4].
If we exclude such objectionable uses of human beings, and we 
still try to design enhanced humans, what are our ends, and which 
are good or desirable ends and which not? I try to sketch below a 
methodical and rational approach for answering this question, without 
arguing here for any specific results. The center of this approach is 
to make explicit the assumptions about human good that secure 
our confidence in the therapeutic applications, and then try to find 
parallel assumptions about human good for the enhancement uses.
Using our two distinctions, and following D’s and S’s, and HGE’s 
grouping of various applications where CRISPR or other gene editing 
might be used, we sorted out all applications of CRISPR and gene 
editing into four main groups (excluding for the moment the two 
research uses). These have been arranged from the least difficult, 
the somatic therapeutic use, to the most difficult, the germline 
enhancement application; not only in technical difficulties (very 
important of course but not our focus here), but also difficulty in 
answering the ethical question of enhancement-the central issue here.
In this ordered series the technical and ethical difficulties are fully 
noted and reflected in the literature; not only in D & S but also in 
the comprehensive HGE, written by a wide and prominent group of 
leaders in the various subfields. There is consensus that the somatic 
therapeutic application is the least difficult, that present rules for its 
use are likely sufficient, and there is confidence in the great benefits of 
this application of this near miraculous biotechnology (especially in 
monogenic diseases where a single gene is responsible, and especially 
where a single letter needs to be edited). At the other end of the series, 
germline enhancement, we find the very opposite: the consensus 
here is that the technical difficulties (of, e.g., safety and efficacy) are 
great, that we need more research to solve these problems, that the 
risk/benefit analysis is far more uncertain because the benefits are 
very uncertain, and that we should have a temporary ban on clinical 
applications, and possibly even on some relevant research. (For this 
consensus see HGE, Ch. 4, pp. 109-10, and Ch. 8, pp. 192-4, the major 
conclusions and recommendations of the whole report; D & S reach 
similar conclusions).
These two opposite attitudes to these two extreme cases seem to 
me well informed, reasonable, and prudent. And in any case, I do not 
write to question them, but rather to explore the differences between 
the two attitudes, by asking why we have this opposition. The two 
intermediate cases, somatic enhancement and germline therapeutic, 
I believe, reveal the  two main and very good reasons, one about ends 
and the other about means. The germline therapeutic case highlights, 
almost isolates, the difficulties of means, germline editing, since in
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favorable risk-benefit analysis, both also satisfy the general principle 
of beneficence, the principle of promoting well being, supporting 
providing benefit and preventing harm (HGE, p. 11). Of course this 
principle and its application presupposes some knowledge or belief 
about what well being is, and what are benefit and harm.
Health and Other Fundamental Human Goods
We saw that we are more confident about therapy than about 
enhancement-something that can be seen clearly in the difference 
in attitudes between somatic therapeutic and somatic enhancement 
applications. If our confidence in therapeutic cases rests on our 
universal agreement that health is a fundamental human good, 
perhaps we can try to work up enhancements in a parallel way: that is, 
we can use generally agreed upon fundamental human goods and evils, 
other than health and disease, to try to specify other enhancements 
or improvements, beyond health, for present and future humans. 
For example: physical strength and physical weakness, accurate and 
erratic memory, higher and lower intelligence, and perhaps several 
other basic goods and ills, in analogy to health and disease.
Of course some of these enhancements may not be within the scope 
of CRISPR and other gene editing technologies, if they have no genetic 
causes; and in such cases CRISPR and other gene editing leaves things 
alone, perhaps to other technologies or to mother nature. Also, we 
are here not speaking of socio-economic goods, for example, income 
and wealth and opportunity and education, which are also not within 
the scope of gene editing; rather we are speaking about human traits, 
characteristics, or conditions that gene editing can affect.
Using inventories of agreed upon fundamental human goods 
and evils, in analogy to health and disease, we could work up a 
corresponding version of enhanced or improved human beings: for 
example, not only healthier human beings, but also physically stronger, 
smarter, with more accurate memories and increased capacities for 
learning, with greater capacity for knowledge, and so on with other 
agreed upon and fundamental human goods within the scope of gene 
editing. Therapy (and enhancement with greater health as a goal), 
is more comfortable to us and we are more assured about it because 
we have the great art-science of medicine, now revolutionized by 
molecular biology and chemistry, with its long experience and safety 
norms and regulations, and we are confident about the good of health. 
So we have to be more careful and cautious with enhancements that 
have other goals, goods other than health. But there are such other 
fundamental goods; health, however fundamental to human well 
being, is surely not the only major good.
Two Assumptions
The approach we have outlined consists in making explicit the 
assumptions about human good that underlie our confidence in 
therapeutic cases, and then try to find similar assumptions about 
human good that can guide enhancement. This approach is itself 
based on two fundamental assumptions:
First, we assume that in the two enhancement applications of gene 
editing, what we want to design and bring about is not simply different 
human being. If simply difference is the goal, only our imaginations 
are the limit. This is not to downgrade human imagination in any way; 
it is likely responsible for some of our greatest achievement in poetry, 
fiction, the visual arts, music, and perhaps science. (D & S appreciate 
imagination too, when at the beginning of their book (p. viii) they 
quote Emerson, “Science does not know its debt to imagination”).
when enhancement aims at goods beyond or outside health. And 
they usually also differ in the existing condition from which they seek 
improvement: therapy starts from disease or disability, enhancement 
from a condition deemed normal or in the normal range.  The point 
here is not to deny the distinction between therapy and enhancement, 
but to see what they have in common: an improvement from an 
existing condition, and that improvement in both cases has some 
important human good as its goal.
Though therapy and enhancement are usually different with 
respect to goals and baselines, it is important to see that we can have 
enhancement even with health as the goal, depending on what baseline 
we start with. If we have an individual with a disease, say, Chronic 
Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL), we can measure his/her elevated white 
blood cell count and use it as a baseline for improvement toward the 
normal range; treating his/her disease would be standardly regarded 
as therapy. But suppose his/her white blood cell count is in the normal 
range (say 4,000 to 10,000), but she/he has a known gene variant 
that makes him/her highly susceptible to CLL, given some trigger; 
if we can, say, delete that variant and eliminate that risk, we have 
improved that individual’s health over his/her lifetime. And that can 
count as enhancement-better health over a life time. In both cases we 
are improving the individual’s health, making her healthier or less 
susceptible to disease. Health can be the goal not only of therapy, as it 
usually is, but also of enhancement if we start from a base of normal 
health and aim at greater health. In these respect, we can have similar 
enhancements with health as the goal in germline editing.
Germline enhancement is more difficult for many reasons, as 
we have seen. One reason we have not discussed is the difficulty of 
agreeing on a baseline for the whole human population, from which 
to judge improvements, whatever the improvements may be. Some 
have suggested what is “normal” for human beings, others what is 
“natural” for human beings, others what is “typical”. But diseases can 
occur as naturally as health, often without any human intervention, as 
different gene variants result from numerous replications of cells. And 
“normal” (and “typical”) as applied to human traits and capacities 
usually signifies a range or spectrum rather than some privileged 
or ideal point: e.g. what is normal in height, weight, strength, visual 
acuity; and many other traits, such as intelligence, which has a huge 
range among human beings. So where do we start from to improve 
or enhance or make better human beings, even when we know what 
traits or conditions we wish to enhance and we know how to do it? 
Where we start might make a difference whether we are doing therapy 
or enhancement. It might also make a difference to the natural 
inequalities that exist among human beings (a “side effect” we should 
be concerned with). Suppose, for example, that sometime in the future 
we could by gene editing increase the intelligence of everyone who 
scores below the normal range on a standard (Stanford-Binet) IQ test, 
so that no one is below the lowest part of the present range. Would we 
be doing therapy or enhancement? Well, we would be making human 
beings smarter and that looks like enhancement if intelligence is a 
great human good; and we would be decreasing the natural or inborn 
inequalities in intelligence among humans and leveling (somewhat) the 
initial playing field of life, thus increasing fairness in life expectations. 
On the other hand if we used editing only to improve the intelligence 
of those who score on the retarded range, we might be doing therapy, 
if being retarded is a disability. Therapy and enhancement in this case 
have in common making human beings smarter, thus better, at least 
if we count human intelligence as a great, fundamental good. We can 
see this commonality at a more abstract level: when successful and 
satisfy the usual standards of safety, efficacy, informed consent, and
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is good and disease an ill: we do not dispute whether health is a good 
(or disease something bad), even when we are not sure about their 
definitions; we dispute rather about sources and means to health, 
access and availability and distribution of such means as nutrition and 
medical care and health insurance.
Accurate human memory, a necessary condition for learning-the 
great human capacity for learning being a fundamental  human good-, 
may be another example of a similarly fundamental good; intelligence 
perhaps another. Can we agree on some such fundamental goods and 
evils, as we do for health and disease? If we can, after reflections and 
discussion, then we have a chance to design future humans with some 
confidence that they really are better humans.
We should remember too that perhaps we are overdoing out doubts 
and concerns about enhancement, especially in the germline editing 
case where we have great difficulties about the editing itself (its safety 
and efficacy). Past misuses and abuses in eugenics, for example, are 
often cited as a basis for doubts and hesitations about enhancements. 
And some doubts and hesitations are certainly in order. But we must 
also remember that judgments of such misuses or abuses presuppose 
some confident judgments about good and evil—how else would we 
know these are misuses or abuses? Perhaps some other basic goods, 
besides health, are equally evident and really generally agreed on. 
I was startled when a colleague, with whom I was discussing these 
issues, turned to me and said, “What parents would not want their 
children to be stronger and smarter?” Greater physical strength 
and greater smarts may be goods as fundamental as health.  S & D 
themselves have no problem reeling off two kinds of enhancements 
“that come to mind… high intelligence, prodigious musical ability, 
mathematical prowess, tall stature, athletic skills, or stunning beauty,” 
though, they point out, these are too complex for CRISPR, at least for 
now. Other enhancements within CRISPR’s powers are “exceptional 
levels of endurance… extra strong bones… leaner muscles… lower 
requirements of daily sleep.” (D & S, p. 230).  While some of these 
might be disputed, and universal distribution of the enhancements 
in the first set might be very problematic (do we want everyone to be 
Mozart?), there seem to be many other human goods besides health 
for enhancements to aim at.
Of course often therapy has priority over enhancement because 
disease can be so disabling. But putting our health at the top or near 
the top of our priorities among major human goods does not thereby 
knock others off the list of such human goods. And some might 
count human intelligence, for example, above even health, generally, 
even though in special medical situations health might still be first 
to try to improve or maintain. Further, human intelligence might be 
something good to have in any environment, as presumably we judge 
health to be.
Other Problems about Gene Editing
Finally, even if we give this approach about enhancement the 
benefit of every doubt, we still have other problems about gene 
editing, technical, ethical, and practical. It is important not to conflate 
them, even if several are interdependent.
We have already mentioned biotechnical challenges about safety-
how to make editing more accurate. And we have ongoing experiments 
about how to target what we wish to edit without triggering editing of 
other partially similar sequences. We have also technical issues about 
efficacy.
Of course any human beings we design for enhancement by 
gene editing would be different from what we are now, and in this 
imagination may indeed have a big role. But here we are talking about 
designing improved or enhanced human beings-making BETTER 
human beings (or making human beings better at, e.g., interactions 
with their environments). Among the many different versions of 
human beings we can imagine, some of which we know historically, 
and some of which we can bring about by editing, we want to know 
which would be better and which worse. And if that is so, we must rely 
on what we confidently think, and generally agree on, is fundamentally 
good and bad for human beings; at least among attributes of human 
beings or personal characteristics within the scope of gene editing, 
as distinct from social and environmental goods and evils. Our task 
here is evaluative to begin with, though not only evaluative-to decide 
what are better human beings and what makes them better-and there 
is no way we can do that and design better human beings without the 
assumption of fundamental human goods and ills.
There is an understandable tendency or desire to try to avoid 
evaluations (value judgments) as much as possible (see, e.g. HGE, ch. 6 
especially pp. 137-140). There are legitimate concerns, as we saw, with 
using the value laden terms “normal” and “natural” (even “mutation” 
is replaced by “gene variant”). More substantially, in the context of 
evolution we have learned that what is or confers an advantage in 
one environment may not be so in another (the example of the sickle 
cell disease is sometimes cited-the gene variant responsible for it can 
confer an advantage in malaria infested environments).But it is by no 
means clear that this relativity of advantage to environment extends 
to all advantages or all human goods. After all, even these variable 
advantages are judged to be advantages or not, given the assumption 
that human survival and reproduction are fundamentally good things.
This tendency or desire to avoid value judgments is understandable, 
because it is difficult to secure objectivity in evaluations, and certainly 
difficult or even impossible to experiment in order to confirm or 
disconfirm value judgments, especially about final ends.
Nevertheless, it may also be difficult, even impossible, to avoid 
value judgments about goals and ends, even in scientific work. The 
research uses of gene editing, for example, assume that understanding 
nature and unlocking its secrets is a great human good, indeed a noble 
end to pursue and give one’s lifetime work to, sometimes at high cost. 
We don’t argue whether understanding nature is a great good, but 
only about how to design and do research that helps us reach that end. 
And all the four major applications of gene editing we have discussed 
which have good goals assume that safety and efficacy are also great 
goods, this time pertaining to means. No one argues whether safety or 
efficacy in gene editing are great goods to be pursued, but only how to 
secure them, even when we are not certain about the ends they are to 
serve (as in the enhancement cases).
Second, we assume that while there may be disagreements about 
some human goods and their order of importance (priorities among 
them), there can also be some general consensus on fundamental 
human goods. The choice of human health and human disease as 
evident examples of fundamental and generally agreed upon human 
good and bad, so prominent and assumed in therapeutic uses, and so 
fundamental to medicine is no accident. The presence of health and 
the absence of disease are so fundamentally good because health is a 
necessary condition for so many human activities and the enjoyment 
of so many other goods, while severe disease is catastrophic for 
nearly everything. And we do have universal agreement that health 
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And we mentioned ethical challenges about permission or consent, 
or autonomy, concepts rather difficult to apply directly to embryos.
We also noted the important ethical problem about the distribution 
of the benefits we can bring about by CRISPR among human beings. 
Here we have questions of justice and fairness that must be raised about 
all four main applications of gene editing. In cases of therapy, who is to 
benefit from gene editing? For example, all human beings absolutely 
equally? Or in proportion to their health or disease or disability? Or 
in proportion to some other needs, such as understanding nature and 
our place in it? In cases of enhancement, even assuming we know 
what enhancement is, should enhancement be regarded as a kind 
of luxury, compared to therapy, and be left wide open to individual 
tastes and resources? At least somatic enhancement might be left to 
individual choice as it is now with some, e.g., cosmetic enhancements; 
while heritable enhancement clearly concerns all human beings and 
all should have a voice in it.
We also have issues of practical application of gene editing, similar 
to availability and access to vaccinations, given the large numbers of 
human beings.
And we have problems of compliance with any agreed upon laws and 
regulations about gene editing; even if we can reach global agreements 
on laws and regulations, some might disobey and try to create human 
beings to serve their own private ends and ambitions. This concern is 
often expressed by S & D and it is of major importance. It is difficult if 
not impossible to have one hundred percent compliance in any law or 
norm; and when it comes to global compliance to global agreements-
the present case of gene editing-the difficulties can be formidable even 
to contemplate.
All these issues are important and urgent and need more research 
and discussion and hopefully general consensus; but they are not the 
center of this paper. Here we have focused mainly on suggesting a 
methodical approach to the main ethical question, whether gene 
editing is good or bad, right or wrong, especially in the difficult 
cases of editing for enhancement, hoping to understand better what 
enhancing or improving a human being would be. Given the extremely 
rapid rate of development of the biotechnology of gene editing, the 
question of what human enhancement is seems urgent indeed. A 
temporary ban on editing for enhancement is not only prudent, but a 
valuable, maybe unique opportunity for fruitful discussion. If we have 
the capacity to create different human beings, we better try hard to 
find out which, if any, among many imagined different human beings 
would be better than what we are now. This concerns every human 
being and everyone should have a voice in it.
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